Unit PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Course: Philosophy and psychological science and techniques
Study-unit Code: A003436
Curriculum: In all curricula
Teacher: Vera Matarese
CFU: 12
Course Regulation: Coorte 2025
Offered: 2025/26
Type of study-unit: Opzionale (Optional)
Type of learning activities: Attività formativa integrata

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND I MODULE

Code	A003447
CFU	6
Teacher	Vera Matarese
Teachers	Vera Matarese
Hours	36 ore - Vera Matarese
Learning activities	Base
Area	Formazione interdisciplinare
Sector	M-FIL/02
Type of study-unit	Opzionale (Optional)
Language of instruction	This course is in English. No use of Italian will be accepted at any point. Students will be invited to test their English with a mock exam during the second lecture. Students who do not have appropriate English proficiency are strongly advised against enrolling to this course. At least, students are expected to be able to pass a B2 English exam.
Contents	Mental phenomena such as desires, fears and thoughts play a crucial role in human activities. One could even maintain that mentality is essential to human nature, as some sort of mental life is necessary for being fully human. This course covers a wide range of issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, such as mental content, the mind-body relation, mental causation, consciousness, the nature of the mind, personal identity, free will, positionality and gender identity. We will explore these topics with a more traditional, a priori methodology, as well as an empirically-oriented approach, which is based on recent scientific developments in neuroscience. Students will be invited to reflect about the main philosophical topics of philosophy of mind, as well as on the methodological and meta-philosophical issues relevant to this fascinating discipline.
Reference texts	All the articles and texts listed in the below schedule, plus Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, John Wiley & Sons. (compulsory). If you are on a tight budget, don't buy it just yet! All the articles and the relevant chapters of the textbook will be provided through uploads on the UniStudium Platform. Other books that I recommend and are useful to pass the exam but that are not compulsory are: Lowe, E. J. (2000). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge university press; and Montero, B. G. (2022). Philosophy of mind: A very short introduction (Vol. 691). Oxford University Press. If you are interested in the topic, and you’d like to delve more into this subject, you may want to read Bayne, T. (2021). Philosophy of mind: an introduction. Routledge. • Sarihan, I. (2017). Philosophical puzzles evade empirical evidence: Some thoughts and clarifications regarding the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind. In The Human Sciences After the Decade of the Brain (pp. 14-23). Academic Press. • Nagel, T. (2007, September). What is the mind-body problem?. In Ciba Foundation Symposium 174-Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (pp. 1-7). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.. • Ludwig, K. (2003). The mind-body problem: An overview. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study only 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. • Van Gulick, Robert, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Nagel, T. (1980). What is it like to be a bat?. In The language and thought series (pp. 159-168). Harvard University Press. • Kirk Ludwig, The Mind–Body Problem: An Overview, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study 1.5, and first paragraph of 1.6 (until p. 13). • David J. Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, p. 102 – 148. • Josh Weisberg, The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/ • Calef, S. (2005). Dualism and mind. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/#H3 o Robb, David, John Heil, and Sophie Gibb, "Mental Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . o Heil, J. (2008). Mental causation. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 214 – 234. • E. Vintiadis (2019) ‘Property Dualism‘ in Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Heather Salazar, in the series Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Christina Hendricks, Rebus Foundation Publishing, Quebec, Canada. • Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Howard Robinson (2008), Dualism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study ONLY what is highlighted in YELLOW. • Please watch the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUfOCY6cg4E&t=65s • Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study the whole document. • Alter, T. (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 90(1), 35-56. o Melnyk, Physicalism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, p. 65 – 85. o Melnyk, A. (1997). How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12), 622-637. • Robert Francescotti, Supervenience and the Mind, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/supermin/ • Melnyk, A. (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?. Philosophy Compass, 3(6), 1281-1296. • Larry Hauser, Behaviorism, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/behaviorism/#SH1b • Graham, George, “Behaviorism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Russellian Monism, "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Philip Goff, 'Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness' (2016) in S. Leach & J. Tartaglia (Eds.) Consciousness and the Great Philosophers, Routledge. • Philip Goff, 'Panpsychism' (2017) in Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (Eds.) Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Edition, Blackwell. • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Arguments for Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Objections to Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Putnam, H. (1980). Brains and behavior. In The Language and Thought Series (pp. 24-36). Harvard University Press. • Levin, Janet, "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific american, 244(1), 114-123. • Schwarz, W. (2015). Analytic functionalism. A companion to David Lewis, 504-518. • Hutto, Daniel and Ian Ravenscroft, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Stich, S. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Folk psychology. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 235-255. • Barlassina, Luca and Robert M. Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Eric Olson, Personal Identity, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. All except for sections 15.4; 15.5; 15.6 • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . o Ameriks, K. (1977). Criteria of Personal Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 47-69. • Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity” in Stich S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Witt, C. (2011). The metaphysics of gender. Oup Usa. Chapters 1-2 • Witt, C. (2010). What is gender essentialism?. In Feminist metaphysics: Explorations in the ontology of sex, gender and the self (pp. 11-25). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. • Ismael, J. T. (2016). How Can I Be Free if My Actions Are Determined by Physical Laws? The Consequence Argument. In How Physics makes us free. • Esfeld, M. (2022). Super-Humeanism and mental causation. In Powers, time and free will (pp. 257-272). Cham: Springer International Publishing. • Esfeld, M. (2019). Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will. Organon F, 26(1), 62-85.
Educational objectives	My hope is that this course will help you become a good learner and thinker. In particular, we will cultivate together the following intellectual virtues: • Virtue of Reflection: After reading the assigned literature, you will contribute to your personal intellectual journal, reflecting on what you’ve learned. We will also hold group discussions to share and deepen these reflections. • Virtue of Intellectual Carefulness and Accuracy: We will frequently discuss the papers you read, enhancing our ability to articulate viewpoints accurately and carefully. • Virtue of Open-Mindedness: By engaging with different views on the mind and its relation to the body, we will learn how to be open-minded and consider all options without prejudice. • Virtue of Critical Thinking: We will learn to build arguments and counterarguments, analyze, and critically assess the different theories of the mind. • Virtue of Humility: By interacting with peers and considering counterarguments to our own views, we will learn how our perspectives can be enriched and challenged by others. • Virtue of Intellectual Autonomy: Students will be encouraged to think independently, to develop and defend their own positions. • Virtue of Clarity: Through written and oral assignments, students will cultivate the ability to communicate complex ideas clearly and effectively. • Virtue of Intellectual Courage: Students will be encouraged to voice and defend their perspectives on controversial topics, gaining confidence in their opinions. • Virtue of Resilience: By reading difficult papers, we will learn to persist through difficulties, embracing effort as a rewarding part of the intellectual journey.
Prerequisites	English B2 level
Teaching methods	As a teacher, I fully embrace virtue character education (You can have an idea of what it is by reading this: What is educating for intellectual virtues? – Intellectual Virtues and some materials on my website). Teaching goes beyond increasing and enriching your knowledge. Nor is it merely enhancing your cognitive abilities, such as the abilities to analyze, synthesize, understand, or think critically. Teaching is rather helping you cultivate intellectual virtues proper of a good learner and of a good thinker. Such virtues include: intellectual depth, intellectual empathy and tolerance, intellectual curiosity, self-confidence and courage, self-reflection, intellectual clarity, carefulness and wisdom. During my lectures, I am committed to supporting and maintaining a thriving climate for everyone, especially for underrepresented students and for students with special needs. In order to implement an inclusive climate, I ask everyone in the class to follow some norms of inclusiveness, which are especially important during discussion time. Here I list some of them: be nice; don’t interrupt; don’t present objections as flat dismissals, don’t be incredulous, don’t roll your eyes, make faces or laugh; don’t start side discussions parallel to main conversations; acknowledge your interlocutor’s insights; be constructive, don’t dominate the discussion; don’t use offensive examples; raise your hand to ask questions and wait for your turn patiently; don’t worry about impressing the teacher or your fellow mates. Thank you!
Other information	Some limited part of the material in this course may be technical and challenging. This is a reminder that cultivating intellectual virtues requires dedication, hard work, perseverance, and resilience. Also, remember our “three-L rule”: take care of the least, the last, and the lost in your class. Don’t hesitate to reach out to me or to your peers for support!
Learning verification modality	For the final exam, you will have to select two questions from a list provided on the exam sheet, and write two short, argumentative essays (1000 words each). These essays should demonstrate not only your knowledge of the topics but also, and most importantly, your perspective on specific issues. To support your work, when the course stars you’ll receive a clear grading rubric, and we’ll have sessions focused on essay writing, which will include self-assessment exercises and peer review editing groups. Course policies: Plagiarism and cheating constitute a violation of academic integrity and will not be accepted.
Extended program	PART A: 1. Introduction Questions: o What do you think the mind is? How do you conceptualize it? Can you list some phenomena that are properly mental? o What do you think philosophy of mind is? Why did you enroll in this class and what are your expectations? o Do you think that philosophy of mind should engage with neuroscience? 2. The mind-body problem Questions: o How do you think of the ‘place’ of the mind? Is it in the physical world or not? Should we distinguish between mental phenomena and physical ones? o Do you think that your mental states such as desires or fears interact with the physical states of your body? How do they interact? o Do you think it would be easier to defend the view that mental phenomena reduce to physical ones or that they belong to another kind of substance? o Do you think it would be easier to defend the view that mental phenomena interact or do not interact with the physical states of your body? Readings: • Sarihan, I. (2017). Philosophical puzzles evade empirical evidence: Some thoughts and clarifications regarding the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind. In The Human Sciences After the Decade of the Brain (pp. 14-23). Academic Press. • Nagel, T. (2007, September). What is the mind-body problem?. In Ciba Foundation Symposium 174-Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (pp. 1-7). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.. 3. The marks of the mental Questions: o What is the mark of the mental? How would you define ‘the mental’? o Can you distinguish between consciousness and intentionality? o Can you list some intentional states? o Do you think that consciousness is irreducible? o What is the main claim of Nagel’s paper? Readings: • Ludwig, K. (2003). The mind-body problem: An overview. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study only 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. • Van Gulick, Robert, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Nagel, T. (1980). What is it like to be a bat?. In The language and thought series (pp. 159-168). Harvard University Press. 4. The Logical space of the mind-body problem Questions o How would you explain the mind-body problem? o Can you distinguish between the easy problem and the hard problem? Do you think it is meaningful to distinguish these two kinds of problem? Readings: • Kirk Ludwig, The Mind–Body Problem: An Overview, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study 1.5, and first paragraph of 1.6 (until p. 13). • David J. Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, p. 102 – 148. • Josh Weisberg, The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/ 5. Substance Dualism Questions: o What is a substance? How can there be more kinds of substance? o Do you think that Descarte’s dualism is a view of the mind that aligns well with current science? o Do you think that first-person experience is more reliable than third-person experience? o What do you think it is the most challenging problem for substance dualism? Readings: • Calef, S. (2005). Dualism and mind. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/#H3 6. Mental causation Questions: o How would you explain the problem of mental causation? o Do you think that the physical world is causally autonomous? How is this concept related to physical closure? o Why is it that allowing mental states to cause physical ones would create a case of overdetermination? o Do you think that allowing mental states to be causes of physical states would require a change of laws of nature or even of physical principles such as conservation of energy? o Would you be able to argue for transference theory? Readings: o Robb, David, John Heil, and Sophie Gibb, "Mental Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . o Heil, J. (2008). Mental causation. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 214 – 234. 7. Property Dualism Questions: o What is a property and how is it different from substance? o How can one conceptualize the relation between mental and physical properties? o Can you explain what emergence is? What is an emergent state or property? o Do you think that the concept of supervenience can be of any help to understand the relation between physical and mental properties? What would constitute the supervenience basis? Readings: • E. Vintiadis (2019) ‘Property Dualism‘ in Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Heather Salazar, in the series Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Christina Hendricks, Rebus Foundation Publishing, Quebec, Canada. • Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 8. Predicate Dualism: Questions: o What is a predicate and why should we distinguish predicates from properties? o Do you think that predicate dualism aligns better with dualism or physicalism? o What are bridging laws? o Try to argue for the view that a scientific realist cannot endorse predicate dualism and ontological dualism at the same time. Try to argue for the opposite view. Readings: • Howard Robinson (2008), Dualism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study ONLY what is highlighted in YELLOW. • Please watch the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUfOCY6cg4E&t=65s 9. Materialism Questions o What is materialism? o Which argument do you find most convincing, the explanatory argument, the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument? o Who is Mary and why her case has any implications for Materialism? o How many kinds of materialism could you list? Which one is the strongest? Readings: • Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study the whole document. • Alter, T. (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 90(1), 35-56. 10. Physicalism Questions: o How do you define the adjective ‘physical’? o Do you think that a table reduces to a conglomerate of atoms or that it is identical to it? Would you rather claim that a table does not exist as what exists is just a conglomerate of particles? o Can you explain why multiple realizability constitutes a threat to physicalism? o Can you explain the difference between Type-Type Identity and Token-Token Identity? Readings: o Melnyk, Physicalism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, p. 65 – 85. o Melnyk, A. (1997). How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12), 622-637. 11. Non-reductive Physicalism Questions: o Would you say that supervenience can account for a kind of non-reductive physicalism? o What is the explanatory problem and the ontological problem that afflict the notion of Supervenience? Readings: • Robert Francescotti, Supervenience and the Mind, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/supermin/ • Melnyk, A. (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?. Philosophy Compass, 3(6), 1281-1296. 12. Behaviourism Questions: o What is the core claim of Behaviourism? o How many kinds of behaviourism can you remember? How do you distinguish them? o Why is behaviourism usually connected to verificationism? o Do you think that behaviourism aligns well with science? Readings: • Larry Hauser, Behaviorism, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/behaviorism/#SH1b • Graham, George, “Behaviorism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 13. Panpsychism Questions o Do you think that electrons are conscious beings? Why? o What is Russellian Monism and how is it connected to Panpsychism? o What is the strongest argument supporting Panpsychism? What is the strongest argument against Panpsychism? Readings • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Russellian Monism, "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Philip Goff, 'Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness' (2016) in S. Leach & J. Tartaglia (Eds.) Consciousness and the Great Philosophers, Routledge. • Philip Goff, 'Panpsychism' (2017) in Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (Eds.) Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Edition, Blackwell. • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Arguments for Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Objections to Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 14. Functionalism Questions: o Do you agree with the idea that mental states should be identified through the causal role they play in a network of relations connecting other mental states or physical states or behaviours? o Can you explain the difference between role and realizer functionalism? o What is a higher or second order property? o Do you find Machine Functionalism more compelling than Analytic Functionalism? o What are Ramsey Sentences and why are they important for Functionalism? o Do you agree that functionalism can solve the Multiple Realizability challenge? Readings: • Putnam, H. (1980). Brains and behavior. In The Language and Thought Series (pp. 24-36). Harvard University Press. • Levin, Janet, "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific american, 244(1), 114-123. • Schwarz, W. (2015). Analytic functionalism. A companion to David Lewis, 504-518. PART B i. Special Issues in Analytic Philosophy of Mind (teacher: Vera Matarese) 15. Folk Psychology, Mind Reading, Mental Simulations Questions: o Why does functionalism need Folk Psychology? o What is the platitude account? o Do you think should understand folk psychology as a sort of mental simulation? Readings: • Hutto, Daniel and Ian Ravenscroft, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Stich, S. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Folk psychology. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 235-255. • Barlassina, Luca and Robert M. Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 16. Personal Identity Questions: • Do you think you are the same person as the one you were yesterday? If so, what makes you the same person as the one you were yesterday? • Are you essentially a person? • What is the persistence question? Readings: • Eric Olson, Personal Identity, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. All except for sections 15.4; 15.5; 15.6 • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 17. Animalism Questions: o Do you regard yourself as identical to an animal? o What is the thinking animal argument? o Do you prefer a relational or non-relational definition of animalism? Readings: • Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 18. Bodily and Brain criteria Questions: o Can a body or a brain provide the persistence conditions of a person? o If your brain were transplanted in another human, would you be that human or would you be the same person, without a brain? Readings: o Ameriks, K. (1977). Criteria of Personal Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 47-69. 19. The psychological approach Questions: o Is a person a psychological being first of all? o Do you think that the psychological approach could resolve the question of persistence? o Argue against the Lockean view. Readings: • Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity” in Stich S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 20. The Metaphysics of Gender Questions: o Are you realist about gender? o Do you find it easier to defend gender essentialism or gender lockean nominalism? o What is the main claim of gender uniessentialism? What does it mean to say that gender is the mega-social role? Readings: • Witt, C. (2011). The metaphysics of gender. Oup Usa. Chapters 1-2 • Witt, C. (2010). What is gender essentialism?. In Feminist metaphysics: Explorations in the ontology of sex, gender and the self (pp. 11-25). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 21. Free Will, Determinism and Humeanism Questions: o What is the consequence argument? Can the argument run for deterministic and indeterministic contexts? o What are laws of nature? Do you think that they guide the universe nomically or they are just the best description of regularities in the world? o What is the best humean system of lawhood? o Is it easier for a humean or a super-humean to endorse the existence of free will? Readings: • Ismael, J. T. (2016). How Can I Be Free if My Actions Are Determined by Physical Laws? The Consequence Argument. In How Physics makes us free. • Esfeld, M. (2022). Super-Humeanism and mental causation. In Powers, time and free will (pp. 257-272). Cham: Springer International Publishing. • Esfeld, M. (2019). Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will. Organon F, 26(1), 62-85
Obiettivi Agenda 2030 per lo sviluppo sostenibile	4, 5, 10

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND II MODULE

Code	A003448
CFU	6
Teacher	Vera Matarese
Teachers	Vera Matarese
Hours	36 ore - Vera Matarese
Learning activities	Base
Area	Formazione interdisciplinare
Sector	M-FIL/02
Type of study-unit	Opzionale (Optional)
Language of instruction	This course is in English. No use of Italian will be accepted at any point. Students will be invited to test their English with a mock exam during the second lecture. Students who do not have appropriate English proficiency are strongly advised against enrolling to this course. At least, students are expected to be able to pass a B2 English exam.
Contents	Mental phenomena such as desires, fears and thoughts play a crucial role in human activities. One could even maintain that mentality is essential to human nature, as some sort of mental life is necessary for being fully human. This course covers a wide range of issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body relation, mental causation, consciousness, the nature of the mind, personal identity, and free will. Students will be invited to reflect about the main philosophical topics of philosophy of mind, as well as on the methodological and meta-philosophical issues relevant to this fascinating discipline.
Reference texts	All the articles and texts listed in the below schedule, plus Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, John Wiley & Sons. (compulsory). If you are on a tight budget, don't buy it just yet! All the articles and the relevant chapters of the textbook will be provided through uploads on the UniStudium Platform. Other books that I recommend and are useful to pass the exam but that are not compulsory are: Lowe, E. J. (2000). An introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge university press; and Montero, B. G. (2022). Philosophy of mind: A very short introduction (Vol. 691). Oxford University Press. If you are interested in the topic, and you’d like to delve more into this subject, you may want to read Bayne, T. (2021). Philosophy of mind: an introduction. Routledge. • Sarihan, I. (2017). Philosophical puzzles evade empirical evidence: Some thoughts and clarifications regarding the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind. In The Human Sciences After the Decade of the Brain (pp. 14-23). Academic Press. • Nagel, T. (2007, September). What is the mind-body problem?. In Ciba Foundation Symposium 174-Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (pp. 1-7). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.. • Ludwig, K. (2003). The mind-body problem: An overview. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study only 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. • Van Gulick, Robert, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Nagel, T. (1980). What is it like to be a bat?. In The language and thought series (pp. 159-168). Harvard University Press. • Kirk Ludwig, The Mind–Body Problem: An Overview, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study 1.5, and first paragraph of 1.6 (until p. 13). • David J. Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, p. 102 – 148. • Josh Weisberg, The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/ • Calef, S. (2005). Dualism and mind. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/#H3 o Robb, David, John Heil, and Sophie Gibb, "Mental Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . o Heil, J. (2008). Mental causation. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 214 – 234. • E. Vintiadis (2019) ‘Property Dualism‘ in Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Heather Salazar, in the series Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Christina Hendricks, Rebus Foundation Publishing, Quebec, Canada. • Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Howard Robinson (2008), Dualism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study ONLY what is highlighted in YELLOW. • Please watch the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUfOCY6cg4E&t=65s • Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study the whole document. • Alter, T. (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 90(1), 35-56. o Melnyk, Physicalism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, p. 65 – 85. o Melnyk, A. (1997). How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12), 622-637. • Robert Francescotti, Supervenience and the Mind, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/supermin/ • Melnyk, A. (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?. Philosophy Compass, 3(6), 1281-1296. • Larry Hauser, Behaviorism, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/behaviorism/#SH1b • Graham, George, “Behaviorism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Russellian Monism, "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Philip Goff, 'Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness' (2016) in S. Leach & J. Tartaglia (Eds.) Consciousness and the Great Philosophers, Routledge. • Philip Goff, 'Panpsychism' (2017) in Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (Eds.) Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Edition, Blackwell. • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Arguments for Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Objections to Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Putnam, H. (1980). Brains and behavior. In The Language and Thought Series (pp. 24-36). Harvard University Press. • Levin, Janet, "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific american, 244(1), 114-123. • Schwarz, W. (2015). Analytic functionalism. A companion to David Lewis, 504-518. • Hutto, Daniel and Ian Ravenscroft, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Stich, S. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Folk psychology. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 235-255. • Barlassina, Luca and Robert M. Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Eric Olson, Personal Identity, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. All except for sections 15.4; 15.5; 15.6 • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . o Ameriks, K. (1977). Criteria of Personal Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 47-69. • Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity” in Stich S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Witt, C. (2011). The metaphysics of gender. Oup Usa. Chapters 1-2 • Witt, C. (2010). What is gender essentialism?. In Feminist metaphysics: Explorations in the ontology of sex, gender and the self (pp. 11-25). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. • Ismael, J. T. (2016). How Can I Be Free if My Actions Are Determined by Physical Laws? The Consequence Argument. In How Physics makes us free. • Esfeld, M. (2022). Super-Humeanism and mental causation. In Powers, time and free will (pp. 257-272). Cham: Springer International Publishing. • Esfeld, M. (2019). Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will. Organon F, 26(1), 62-85.
Educational objectives	My hope is that this course will help you become a good learner and thinker. In particular, we will cultivate together the following intellectual virtues: • Virtue of Reflection: After reading the assigned literature, you will contribute to your personal intellectual journal, reflecting on what you’ve learned. We will also hold group discussions to share and deepen these reflections. • Virtue of Intellectual Carefulness and Accuracy: We will frequently discuss the papers you read, enhancing our ability to articulate viewpoints accurately and carefully. • Virtue of Open-Mindedness: By engaging with different views on the mind and its relation to the body, we will learn how to be open-minded and consider all options without prejudice. • Virtue of Critical Thinking: We will learn to build arguments and counterarguments, analyze, and critically assess the different theories of the mind. • Virtue of Humility: By interacting with peers and considering counterarguments to our own views, we will learn how our perspectives can be enriched and challenged by others. • Virtue of Intellectual Autonomy: Students will be encouraged to think independently, to develop and defend their own positions. • Virtue of Clarity: Through written and oral assignments, students will cultivate the ability to communicate complex ideas clearly and effectively. • Virtue of Intellectual Courage: Students will be encouraged to voice and defend their perspectives on controversial topics, gaining confidence in their opinions. • Virtue of Resilience: By reading difficult papers, we will learn to persist through difficulties, embracing effort as a rewarding part of the intellectual journey.
Prerequisites	At least, students are expected to be able to pass a B2 English exam.
Teaching methods	As a teacher, I fully embrace virtue character education (You can have an idea of what it is by reading this: What is educating for intellectual virtues? – Intellectual Virtues and some materials on my website). Teaching goes beyond increasing and enriching your knowledge. Nor is it merely enhancing your cognitive abilities, such as the abilities to analyze, synthesize, understand, or think critically. Teaching is rather helping you cultivate intellectual virtues proper of a good learner and of a good thinker. Such virtues include: intellectual depth, intellectual empathy and tolerance, intellectual curiosity, self-confidence and courage, self-reflection, intellectual clarity, carefulness and wisdom. During my lectures, I am committed to supporting and maintaining a thriving climate for everyone, especially for underrepresented students and for students with special needs. In order to implement an inclusive climate, I ask everyone in the class to follow some norms of inclusiveness, which are especially important during discussion time. Here I list some of them: be nice; don’t interrupt; don’t present objections as flat dismissals, don’t be incredulous, don’t roll your eyes, make faces or laugh; don’t start side discussions parallel to main conversations; acknowledge your interlocutor’s insights; be constructive, don’t dominate the discussion; don’t use offensive examples; raise your hand to ask questions and wait for your turn patiently; don’t worry about impressing the teacher or your fellow mates. Thank you!
Other information	Some limited part of the material in this course may be technical and challenging. This is a reminder that cultivating intellectual virtues requires dedication, hard work, perseverance, and resilience. Also, remember our “three-L rule”: take care of the least, the last, and the lost in your class. Don’t hesitate to reach out to me or to your peers for support!
Learning verification modality	For the final exam, you will have to select two questions from a list provided on the exam sheet, and write two short, argumentative essays (1000 words each). These essays should demonstrate not only your knowledge of the topics but also, and most importantly, your perspective on specific issues. To support your work, when the course stars you’ll receive a clear grading rubric, and we’ll have sessions focused on essay writing, which will include self-assessment exercises and peer review editing groups. Course policies: Plagiarism and cheating constitute a violation of academic integrity and will not be accepted.
Extended program	PART A: 1. Introduction Questions: o What do you think the mind is? How do you conceptualize it? Can you list some phenomena that are properly mental? o What do you think philosophy of mind is? Why did you enroll in this class and what are your expectations? o Do you think that philosophy of mind should engage with neuroscience? 2. The mind-body problem Questions: o How do you think of the ‘place’ of the mind? Is it in the physical world or not? Should we distinguish between mental phenomena and physical ones? o Do you think that your mental states such as desires or fears interact with the physical states of your body? How do they interact? o Do you think it would be easier to defend the view that mental phenomena reduce to physical ones or that they belong to another kind of substance? o Do you think it would be easier to defend the view that mental phenomena interact or do not interact with the physical states of your body? Readings: • Sarihan, I. (2017). Philosophical puzzles evade empirical evidence: Some thoughts and clarifications regarding the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind. In The Human Sciences After the Decade of the Brain (pp. 14-23). Academic Press. • Nagel, T. (2007, September). What is the mind-body problem?. In Ciba Foundation Symposium 174-Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (pp. 1-7). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.. 3. The marks of the mental Questions: o What is the mark of the mental? How would you define ‘the mental’? o Can you distinguish between consciousness and intentionality? o Can you list some intentional states? o Do you think that consciousness is irreducible? o What is the main claim of Nagel’s paper? Readings: • Ludwig, K. (2003). The mind-body problem: An overview. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study only 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. • Van Gulick, Robert, "Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Nagel, T. (1980). What is it like to be a bat?. In The language and thought series (pp. 159-168). Harvard University Press. 4. The Logical space of the mind-body problem Questions o How would you explain the mind-body problem? o Can you distinguish between the easy problem and the hard problem? Do you think it is meaningful to distinguish these two kinds of problem? Readings: • Kirk Ludwig, The Mind–Body Problem: An Overview, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 1-46. Please study 1.5, and first paragraph of 1.6 (until p. 13). • David J. Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature, The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, p. 102 – 148. • Josh Weisberg, The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/ 5. Substance Dualism Questions: o What is a substance? How can there be more kinds of substance? o Do you think that Descarte’s dualism is a view of the mind that aligns well with current science? o Do you think that first-person experience is more reliable than third-person experience? o What do you think it is the most challenging problem for substance dualism? Readings: • Calef, S. (2005). Dualism and mind. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/#H3 6. Mental causation Questions: o How would you explain the problem of mental causation? o Do you think that the physical world is causally autonomous? How is this concept related to physical closure? o Why is it that allowing mental states to cause physical ones would create a case of overdetermination? o Do you think that allowing mental states to be causes of physical states would require a change of laws of nature or even of physical principles such as conservation of energy? o Would you be able to argue for transference theory? Readings: o Robb, David, John Heil, and Sophie Gibb, "Mental Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . o Heil, J. (2008). Mental causation. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 214 – 234. 7. Property Dualism Questions: o What is a property and how is it different from substance? o How can one conceptualize the relation between mental and physical properties? o Can you explain what emergence is? What is an emergent state or property? o Do you think that the concept of supervenience can be of any help to understand the relation between physical and mental properties? What would constitute the supervenience basis? Readings: • E. Vintiadis (2019) ‘Property Dualism‘ in Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Heather Salazar, in the series Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Christina Hendricks, Rebus Foundation Publishing, Quebec, Canada. • Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 8. Predicate Dualism: Questions: o What is a predicate and why should we distinguish predicates from properties? o Do you think that predicate dualism aligns better with dualism or physicalism? o What are bridging laws? o Try to argue for the view that a scientific realist cannot endorse predicate dualism and ontological dualism at the same time. Try to argue for the opposite view. Readings: • Howard Robinson (2008), Dualism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study ONLY what is highlighted in YELLOW. • Please watch the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUfOCY6cg4E&t=65s 9. Materialism Questions o What is materialism? o Which argument do you find most convincing, the explanatory argument, the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument? o Who is Mary and why her case has any implications for Materialism? o How many kinds of materialism could you list? Which one is the strongest? Readings: • Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature. In Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (eds). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. Please study the whole document. • Alter, T. (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 90(1), 35-56. 10. Physicalism Questions: o How do you define the adjective ‘physical’? o Do you think that a table reduces to a conglomerate of atoms or that it is identical to it? Would you rather claim that a table does not exist as what exists is just a conglomerate of particles? o Can you explain why multiple realizability constitutes a threat to physicalism? o Can you explain the difference between Type-Type Identity and Token-Token Identity? Readings: o Melnyk, Physicalism, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons, p. 65 – 85. o Melnyk, A. (1997). How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12), 622-637. 11. Non-reductive Physicalism Questions: o Would you say that supervenience can account for a kind of non-reductive physicalism? o What is the explanatory problem and the ontological problem that afflict the notion of Supervenience? Readings: • Robert Francescotti, Supervenience and the Mind, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/supermin/ • Melnyk, A. (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?. Philosophy Compass, 3(6), 1281-1296. 12. Behaviourism Questions: o What is the core claim of Behaviourism? o How many kinds of behaviourism can you remember? How do you distinguish them? o Why is behaviourism usually connected to verificationism? o Do you think that behaviourism aligns well with science? Readings: • Larry Hauser, Behaviorism, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/behaviorism/#SH1b • Graham, George, “Behaviorism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 13. Panpsychism Questions o Do you think that electrons are conscious beings? Why? o What is Russellian Monism and how is it connected to Panpsychism? o What is the strongest argument supporting Panpsychism? What is the strongest argument against Panpsychism? Readings • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Russellian Monism, "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Philip Goff, 'Bertrand Russell and the problem of consciousness' (2016) in S. Leach & J. Tartaglia (Eds.) Consciousness and the Great Philosophers, Routledge. • Philip Goff, 'Panpsychism' (2017) in Schneider, S. & Velmans, M. (Eds.) Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd Edition, Blackwell. • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Arguments for Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Goff, Philip, William Seager, and Sean Allen-Hermanson, Objections to Panpsychism, in "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 14. Functionalism Questions: o Do you agree with the idea that mental states should be identified through the causal role they play in a network of relations connecting other mental states or physical states or behaviours? o Can you explain the difference between role and realizer functionalism? o What is a higher or second order property? o Do you find Machine Functionalism more compelling than Analytic Functionalism? o What are Ramsey Sentences and why are they important for Functionalism? o Do you agree that functionalism can solve the Multiple Realizability challenge? Readings: • Putnam, H. (1980). Brains and behavior. In The Language and Thought Series (pp. 24-36). Harvard University Press. • Levin, Janet, "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . • Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific american, 244(1), 114-123. • Schwarz, W. (2015). Analytic functionalism. A companion to David Lewis, 504-518. PART B i. Special Issues in Analytic Philosophy of Mind (teacher: Vera Matarese) 15. Folk Psychology, Mind Reading, Mental Simulations Questions: o Why does functionalism need Folk Psychology? o What is the platitude account? o Do you think should understand folk psychology as a sort of mental simulation? Readings: • Hutto, Daniel and Ian Ravenscroft, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . • Stich, S. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Folk psychology. The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind, 235-255. • Barlassina, Luca and Robert M. Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 16. Personal Identity Questions: • Do you think you are the same person as the one you were yesterday? If so, what makes you the same person as the one you were yesterday? • Are you essentially a person? • What is the persistence question? Readings: • Eric Olson, Personal Identity, in Stich, S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. All except for sections 15.4; 15.5; 15.6 • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 17. Animalism Questions: o Do you regard yourself as identical to an animal? o What is the thinking animal argument? o Do you prefer a relational or non-relational definition of animalism? Readings: • Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 18. Bodily and Brain criteria Questions: o Can a body or a brain provide the persistence conditions of a person? o If your brain were transplanted in another human, would you be that human or would you be the same person, without a brain? Readings: o Ameriks, K. (1977). Criteria of Personal Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 47-69. 19. The psychological approach Questions: o Is a person a psychological being first of all? o Do you think that the psychological approach could resolve the question of persistence? o Argue against the Lockean view. Readings: • Olson, Eric T. “Personal Identity” in Stich S. P., & Warfield, T. A. (2008). The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind. John Wiley & Sons. • Olson, Eric T., "Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = . 20. The Metaphysics of Gender Questions: o Are you realist about gender? o Do you find it easier to defend gender essentialism or gender lockean nominalism? o What is the main claim of gender uniessentialism? What does it mean to say that gender is the mega-social role? Readings: • Witt, C. (2011). The metaphysics of gender. Oup Usa. Chapters 1-2 • Witt, C. (2010). What is gender essentialism?. In Feminist metaphysics: Explorations in the ontology of sex, gender and the self (pp. 11-25). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 21. Free Will, Determinism and Humeanism Questions: o What is the consequence argument? Can the argument run for deterministic and indeterministic contexts? o What are laws of nature? Do you think that they guide the universe nomically or they are just the best description of regularities in the world? o What is the best humean system of lawhood? o Is it easier for a humean or a super-humean to endorse the existence of free will? Readings: • Ismael, J. T. (2016). How Can I Be Free if My Actions Are Determined by Physical Laws? The Consequence Argument. In How Physics makes us free. • Esfeld, M. (2022). Super-Humeanism and mental causation. In Powers, time and free will (pp. 257-272). Cham: Springer International Publishing. • Esfeld, M. (2019). Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will. Organon F, 26(1), 62-85
Obiettivi Agenda 2030 per lo sviluppo sostenibile	4, 5, 10

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